













Individual heterogeneity and pension choices:  
How to communicate an effective message? 
 
 










            *University of Modena and Reggio Emilia 




** University of Tilburg  
Netspar - Network for Studies on Pensions, Aging and Retirement  




ISSN: 2281-440X online 
1 
 
Individual heterogeneity and pension choices: How to 
communicate an effective message?§ 
Giovanni Gallo 
University of Modena and Reggio Emilia, CAPP, and Marco Biagi Foundation 
Costanza Torricelli 
University of Modena and Reggio Emilia, CEFIN, and CERP 
Arthur van Soest 





We use the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) to explain how communication influences the 
heterogeneity in pension choices. To this end we exploit the 2007 Italian reform that allowed 
transferring future severance pay contributions into a pension fund and was accompanied by an 
information campaign with a clear message. According to ELM, individuals follow either a “central 
route” or a “peripheral route” depending on their motivation and ability to think, and eventually 
change or retain their initial attitude. Based on Logit models and data from the Bank of Italy Survey 
on Household Income and Wealth, we find that the decision to transfer the severance pay into a 
pension fund was taken by more educated and older individuals, with high household income. Since 
the reform was mainly directed at low income and younger individuals, this result suggest that the 
information campaign was not very effective. Moreover, our findings show that generic financial 
literacy does not significantly affect decision consciousness, pointing at a more relevant role in the 
elaboration process for: the individual’s comprehension of the specific choice object (pension 
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Studies in household finance highlight individual heterogeneity in household portfolio choices 
including those connected to pension choices. Traditional explanations for the heterogeneity in 
participation in pension schemes rest on variation in socio-demographic attributes and economic 
and financial individual or household characteristics (e.g. Huberman et al. (2007) on the 
participation in Defined Contribution (401)k pension plans in the US, and Antolin (2008) on the 
participation in supplementary pension schemes for eight OECD countries). One strand of literature 
specifically investigates the role of education, where low education in general and low financial 
education in particular are often found to have a negative impact; see Lusardi and Mitchell (2006, 
2011) for the US, Fornero and Monticone (2011a) and Rinaldi (2011) for Italy; Coppola and Lamla 
(2013) for Germany. Conversely, Duflo and Saez (2003) find a small positive effect of information 
when choosing to participate in employer sponsored tax deferred accounts, and a larger effect of 
social interactions. Cappelletti and Guazzarotti (2013) use Italian data and confirm a lack of 
knowledge of complementary pension schemes even among those who participate in such a scheme 
- many participants cannot recall their investment strategy or the amount of their annuity. They also 
find that participation rates are particularly low among those who would benefit most, namely 
younger workers. Unsurprisingly, the authors also find that income is the strongest predictor of 
participation, as individuals who earn more have more resources to subscribe. 
In order to explore a different route, this paper aims to explain the heterogeneity in pension 
choices through the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) proposed by American psychologists 
Richard E. Petty and John T. Cacioppo (Petty and Cacioppo, 1983). This essentially models the 
elaboration process that occurs when attempting to change a person’s attitude through 
communication. The amount of elaboration or thinking is different for each individual and varies 
from low to high according to motivation and ability to process the message. When motivation and 
ability to think are high, individuals are inclined to travel a “central route to persuasion”, otherwise 
they follow a “peripheral route to persuasion”. Although the ELM has been mainly used so far in 
marketing studies for consumers’ choices (Jae and Delvecchio, 2004; Petty and Rucker, 2006), it 
lends itself to be used to analyse other types of individual choices connected with a communication 
message. For example, it may be used also to explain the heterogeneity in household financial 
portfolios, because a given (financial) advice can lead to different choices depending on individual 
and household characteristics. 
In particular, we use ELM in order to analyse the heterogeneity in pension choices connected to 
the 2007 Italian reform that allowed transferring future severance pay contributions into a pension 
fund. In fact, the reform was accompanied by an information campaign with a quite clear message 
that resembled an advertisement in favour of the pension fund choice. We use data from the Bank of 
Italy’s Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW), which includes a question on the choice 
concerning transferring the severance pay into a pension fund. We will exploit information of four 
waves: one before (2006) and three after the reform (2008, 2010 and 2012). 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 reviews the general structure of the 
Elaboration Likelihood Model of persuasion. Section 2 describes the Italian reform allowing the 
severance pay transfer into a pension fund. While Section 3 describes the dataset, Section 4 uses 
these data to describe all the steps to assess the effectiveness of the reform message using the ELM. 




1. The Elaboration Likelihood Model of persuasion (ELM) 
 
Figure 1 – The Elaboration Likelihood Model of Persuasion 
 
Source: Petty, Briñol and Priester (2009) 
 
The Elaboration Likelihood Model of persuasion (ELM) (Petty and Cacioppo, 1983) is 
essentially a theory about the thinking processes that can occur when attempting to change a 
person’s attitude through communication. The ELM assumes that any one variable can influence 
attitudes in a number of different ways and that individuals can differ in how carefully and 
extensively they think about a message. In other words, in any given context, the amount of 
individual elaboration or thinking on a message or issue can vary from low to high along an 
“elaboration continuum”. The position along this continuum is determined by considering people’s 
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motivation and ability to process the message presented to them. The concept of ‘motivation’ in the 
ELM consists in personal relevance of the issue, while ‘ability’ refers to resources and skill to 
understand and attend to a message. Ability does not only depend on intelligence, but also on time 
available or distraction in the communication environment. 
According to Petty and Cacioppo (1983), if motivation and ability to think are high, individuals 
are inclined to travel a central route to persuasion. Otherwise they follow a peripheral route to 
persuasion. In the central route, individuals carefully consider the elements of the message in order 
to determine whether what it proposes makes sense and will benefit them in some way. Hence, it is 
reasonable to assume that if someone makes a decision through a central route, their changed 
attitude is relatively enduring, resistant to counter persuasion, and predictive of behaviour (Petty 
and Cacioppo, 1983; Jae and Delvecchio, 2004; Wilson, 2014). On the other hand, if a decision 
process is based on superficial elements, external context, or momentary feelings, then it is likely 
that the resultant peripheral attitude is relatively temporary, susceptible to counter persuasion, and 
not predictive of behaviour. Under this peripheral route, it is therefore likely that the message 
recipient will make a decision without undertaking the effort required to process merits and 
demerits in the message (Petty and Cacioppo, 1983). 
 
2. The severance pay transfer into pension funds: the Italian reform and its main message 
At the start of 1970s the Italian pension system was a mixed social system: with a guaranteed 
minimum pension for all citizens, and a pension based on an average of the last-career earnings for 
workers in the public and private sectors, employees and self-employed. The pension system was 
exclusively funded through a Pay-As-You-Go scheme, determining a substantial coverage 
intervention by the State. The progressive increase in average life expectancy, the falling birth rate, 
the huge government budget deficit, and the slowdown of economic growth made the Italian 
pension system unsustainable in the long term. For these reasons, it has been deeply modified since 
the early 1990s, through reforms aimed at improving its long-term sustainability and redressing its 
main problems (Fornero and Monticone, 2011a). These reforms implied that public pensions fell 
over time, so that future retirees will face the problem how to finance their consumption after 
retirement. According to the State General Accounting Office’s estimates, the replacement rate of a 
private employee will decrease from about 74% in 2010 to 60-65% after 2040 with a contribution 
requirement parity (Ministry of Economics and Finance, 2014). In an attempt to limit this 
overwhelming socio-economic problem, the Italian Government decided to introduce a 
‘supplementary’ pension, or non-compulsory pension, in the form of participation in pension funds. 
This makes the new national pension scheme based on two pillars: I) the Pay-As-You-Go 
compulsory pension, which remains the most important; and II) the non-compulsory pension funded 
through a Defined Contribution scheme, so that the higher the contribution the higher the pension.1 
In addition to pensions, retiring private sector employees in Italy can rely on a severance pay 
(Tfr, Trattamento di fine rapporto) that depends on the length of the employment relationship in the 
same company (it has to be at least eight years long). To finance the Tfr, companies are forced to 
set aside for each employee a percentage of the gross annual salary (about 7.5%) on their annual 
                                                 
1 Actually there is a third additional pillar: the private pension, which is determined by individual/household saving 
investments. This pillar entirely depends on individual responsibility and life-cycle choices, and it is not imposed or 
recommended in any way by the State. 
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budget. Since the severance pay is due only at the end of the employment relationship, it represents 
a loan from employee to company. Indeed for this particular funding source, companies have to set 
aside also an interest, computed at the annual rate of 1.5% plus three quarters of the national 
inflation rate. 
Even though the supplementary pension scheme was introduced since 1992, participation in 
pension funds was much lower than in other developed countries (OECD, 2014). In order to speed 
up the development of the second pillar, the Italian Government decided in 2005 to allow 
employees to transfer their own future severance pay’s contributions into a pension fund as of 
January 1, 2007.2 This reform was motivated by the fact that pension funds generally have a higher 
return than the Tfr one (considering an average inflation rate of about 2% during the decade 
1997-2007, the average return of severance pay was equal to 1.5+0.75×2=3%). Moreover, contrary 
to the severance pay that is received as a lump sum, investments in pension funds can be converted 
into annuities at retirement. The Government’s objective was to develop pension funds to ensure an 
increase in retirement income. 
According to the reform, since the 1st January 2007 all Italian employees in the private sector 
have to choose among three alternatives: i) to deposit their future severance pay contributions (the 
portion set aside up to 31 December 2006 remains in the company) into a pension fund, ii) to leave 
the Tfr in their companies, iii) an intermediate solution (in this case, however, at least 50% of 
severance pay has to be directed into the pension fund).3 To further encourage the participation in 
pension funds, the Government created tax incentives and a silence-as-assent mechanism. In fact, 
Italian employees have six months from the start of their job (or from the start of the law’s 
effectiveness) to communicate the decision of rejection or acceptance, after which their severance 
pay is automatically transferred into a pension fund managed by the Italian National Institute of 
Social Security (Istituto Nazionale di Previdenza Sociale, INPS). There are thus three possible 
scenarios: I) the employee decides not to give up the severance pay and denies the transfer into a 
pension fund; II) the employee decides to transfer Tfr into a pension fund, giving up the severance 
pay at the end of the work relationship; III) the employee does not take a decision, probably because 
he or she has no interest in the message content.4 Once the Tfr is transferred into a pension fund 
(regardless of the explicit choice) this is irrevocable; on the other hand, employees can always 
change their mind and adhere to a fund later. 
Summing up, in terms of the ELM architecture, what is the ‘message’ that the Italian 
Government wanted to give through the 2007 reform? Relying on many different sources (literature, 
publications and media, and as discussed below in Section 4.2 we believe it can be synthetized as 
follows: “Pension funds plus tax incentives linked to them can guarantee a higher retirement 
income, compared to the severance pay (Tfr)”. 
 
                                                 
2 The reform is contained in the Legislative Decree no. 252/2005. This law, supplemented by the Law no. 296/2006 and 
the Legislative Decree no. 28/2007, reforms from the 1st January 2007 the Italian pension system strengthening the role 
of pension funds in order to ensure higher levels of pension coverage. 
3 Since 2010 this reform involved also a part of public employees: those who were hired after January 1, 2001. 
However, since this category is very small and the same reform has different rules regarding public employees, to 
simplify the study we consider only the employees in private sector. 
4 To simplify, we consider the so-called ‘intermediate’ cases, those in which the employee decides to transfer only a 
part of his/her severance pay, in the same way as those in which the employee decides to entirely transfer his/her Tfr. 
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3. Data and sample 
The Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) is a large biennial representative survey 
of the Italian population conducted by the Bank of Italy. For each household member, the SHIW 
provides demographic information (age, level of education, gender and marital status), economic 
information at the household level including net wealth (real and financial assets net of financial 
liabilities) and the amounts invested in a variety of financial assets. Moreover Bank of Italy’s 
survey contains questions on individuals’ levels of financial literacy and knowledge of pension 
funds. 
We use the longitudinal component of SHIW to build a four waves balanced panel from 2006 to 
2012. The panel consists of 6,419 individuals (belonging to 2,767 households) for a total of 25,676 
observations. Since the pension reform under investigation involved only employees in the private 
sector (and not the self-employed), we keep only those who were employed in the private sector in 
2012, and were 16-65 years old in 2006. This leads to a data set of 1,125 individuals (belonging to 
887 households), but we still have to account for some data issues connected to 2007 Italian reform. 
Since the 2008 wave the survey includes a question on the choice to transfer future severance 
pay contributions into a pension fund (see Fornero and Monticone, 2011b). This question has three 
response options: ‘Yes’, ‘No’, and ‘Do not know’. The presence of the ‘Do not know” option means 
that respondents are not forced to pick an answer, minimizing guessing. However this 
methodological choice does not completely prevent the presence of several missing responses (i.e. 
people who did not answer at all to the question) due to: low consciousness of individual pension 
situation; unwillingness to declare information about wealth (Cannari and D’Alessio, 1993; 
D’Alessio and Faiella, 2002); no explicit option for refusing to answer. The data show that in 
numerous cases the answer changes over the 2008-2012 period. This probably happens either 
because the ‘No’ response is revocable and because some people do not have a full consciousness 
or knowledge of their choice about the severance pay transfer into a pension fund. For these 
reasons, we decide to take into account only employees’ answers declared in 2012 survey, dropping 
also from our panel all observations that had a missing answer in 2012 (i.e. 55 observations) and 
accordingly in each wave, since we are working with a balanced panel dataset.5 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics of demographic characteristics of the sample of employees 
obtained as described above. In 2006, about 42% of the sample are women, 96% are Italian citizens. 
Approximately 50% of the respondents live in the North, 20% in the Centre and the remaining 30% 
in the South. 49% of employees live in towns or cities with more than 40,000 inhabitants, while 
29% live in municipalities with less than 20,000 inhabitants. Average age is 38.4, 48% of total 
sample completed high school, and only 8% have a university (or higher) degree. The average 
number of household members is 3.5, 63% of people are married, and 31% are single.  
As for the answers on the severance pay choice, in 2012, 16% of the sample declared they had 
transferred it into a pension fund, 72% of the sample had not, and 12% declared they ‘Do not 
know’.
  
                                                 
5 Alternatively we could have included missing values and interpreted them as well as ‘Do not know’ responses. We 
tested robustness of our final results against this alternative:  the outcomes do not change the conclusions of the analysis 








Total sample Yes No Do not Know Total sample 
Observations 1,070 168 775 127 1,070 
Female 41.5% 34.5% 43.7% 37.0% 41.5% 
Age 38.4 46.9 44.4 41.1 44.4 
Italian 95.7% 99.4% 95.1% 96.9% 96.0% 
Marital status           
  Married 62.9% 75.0% 63.9% 39.4% 62.7% 
  Single 31.1% 19.6% 28.5% 50.4% 29.7% 
  Divorced 5.1% 4.8% 5.9% 10.2% 6.3% 
  Widow 0.8% 0.6% 1.7% 0.0% 1.3% 
Education level           
  Primary 6.5% 1.8% 7.1% 3.1% 5.8% 
  Lower secondary 38.0% 24.4% 36.8% 32.3% 34.3% 
  Secondary 47.8% 60.1% 46.7% 49.6% 49.2% 
  Tertiary 7.7% 13.7% 9.4% 15.0% 10.7% 
Area           
  North 49.8% 62.5% 48.0% 44.1% 49.8% 
  Centre 20.2% 22.0% 19.4% 22.8% 20.2% 
  South 30.0% 15.5% 32.6% 33.1% 30.0% 
Size of municipality           
  < 20,000 inhabitants 29.0% 29.2% 28.0% 34.6% 29.0% 
  20,000 - 40,000 21.9% 15.5% 23.7% 15.0% 21.4% 
  40,000 - 500,000 44.2% 48.2% 43.6% 46.5% 44.7% 
  > 500,000 5.0% 7.1% 4.6% 3.9% 5.0% 
Household size 3.46 3.34 3.34 3.21 3.32 
  
4. An assessment of the effectiveness of the reform message based on ELM 
In order to develop an empirical assessment of the effectiveness of the reform message, we put 
our research question into the traditional ELM scheme. As highlighted by Figure 2, the ELM works 
through a step-by-step sequence, where the message represents the starting point, each intermediate 
step (boxes A, B, C, D, and G) is a specific condition, and the concluding steps (boxes E, F, and H) 




Figure 2 – The employee’s decision process through the Elaboration Likelihood Model  
 
Note: The figure is based on an adaptation of the scheme by Petty, Briñol and Priester (2009).
 
After exposure to the message, the first step is to assess the employee’s involvement in the 
message content (box A in Figure 2). In order to do this, we consider as involved or motivated those 
who respond ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ to the question about the Tfr transfer into a pension fund, showing they 
remember their choice at the time of the survey. Indeed, those who do not know or do not remember 
their response after a few years (or even months), will probably not really be interested in the 
message content. Accordingly, 88% of the sample are involved (72% for ‘No’ response plus 16% 
for ‘Yes’, as discussed in Section 3), while the remaining 12% are not (the ‘Do not know’ answers 
in Table 1).
However, even if involved and motivated, an employee must have the necessary ability to 
process the message (box B in Figure 2). We define the ability to process using four specific 
questions, included in the 2008 survey only, about the possible advantages of pension fund saving 
after the 2007 reform. The precise wording of the four questions is reported below. 
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(1) Pension funds enjoy tax benefits compared to a mutual fund. 
True/False/Do not know. 
(2) When you retire, you can withdraw part of the invested capital. 
True/False/ Do not know. 
(3) There are pension funds with guaranteed minimum returns. 
True/False/Do not know. 
(4) Pension funds guarantee a fixed percentage of the last salary. 
True/False/Do not know. 
 
Table 2 – Statistics of the pension funds questions. Year 2008 
 Question 1 (%) 
No. of correct 
answers % of sample 
Incorrect or 'do not know' 68.8 
Correct 31.2 
Question 2 (%) 
Incorrect or 'do not know' 54.8 0 33.5 
Correct 45.2 1 17.4 
Question 3 (%) 2 23.2 
Incorrect or 'do not know' 56.6 3 21.9 
Correct 43.4 4 4.0 
Question 4 (%) 
Total 
(N = 1,070) 100.0 Incorrect or 'do not know' 74.4 
Correct 25.6 
  
Table 2 shows that only few respondents has a good knowledge of pension funds functioning and 
the reform. In particular, only 4.0% correctly answered all four questions, while 33.5% did not 
answer even one question correctly. The question with the highest percentage of correct answers 
(45.2%) is the one on the possibility of withdrawing part of the capital at retirement, and a similar 
percentage (43.4%) of correct answers is given on the existence of pension funds with guaranteed 
minimum returns. Only about one third (31.2%) know about tax benefits introduced by 2007 
reform, while only about one fourth (25.6%) know that pension funds do not guarantee a fixed 
percentage of the last salary. We define respondents as able to process the message content if they 
correctly answered at least two questions out of four. The sample can then be divided into four 
groups: people who are not involved and not able to process the message content (6.8% of the 
sample); people who are not involved but able (5.1%); people who are involved but not able 
(44.1%); and people who are both involved and able (44.0%). According to the ELM structure only 
the last group of employees can proceed to step C, while the others deviate in step G. 
If the employee does not have the necessary involvement or ability, it is fundamental to assess 
whether or not a peripheral process is operating (box G in Figure 2). To know whether this is the 
case or not, we consider the presence of a change in participation in a pension fund from 2006 to 
2012. Indeed, in a scenario without any peripheral influence, it is plausible that people will retain 
their initial (i.e. 2006) attitude, so that they will still have a pension fund in 2012 if they had one in 
2006 and vice versa (box H in Figure 2). By contrast, a change in 2012 with respect to the initial 
attitude signals the influence of contextual elements on the employee’s behaviour, triggering a 
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‘peripheral route’ (box F in Figure 2). Note that, according to ELM theory, people without 
motivation and ability can never achieve the central route. 
 Examples of contextual elements that can influence the employee’s choice, are the presence of 
unions at the workplace or the role of media. As for the former, several unions decided to sponsor 
specific occupational pension funds inside the workplace. As for the latter, especially in 2007 the 
media (TV, newspapers, radio, websites, etc.) massively reported potential positive and negative 
effects of this controversial reform. Another contextual element is the number of employees in the 
firm, because the reform defined two different regulations in case of transfer denial: for firms with 
more than 50 employees and for smaller firms. Indeed, people employed in firms with less than 50 
employees may receive more pressure for not transferring, since employers can take great 
advantage of their employees’ severance pay if it remains in the firm.6  
Employees who are motivated and able to process the message will, after having scrutinized the 
message and collected all necessary information, try to evaluate if they are less or more favourable 
to pension fund participation than before receiving the message (box C in Figure 2). As for box G, 
here we use a change in the participation in a pension fund from 2006 to 2012 as a signal. In fact, 
regardless their motivation or ability, employees can always choose to retain their initial attitude 
(box H in Figure 2) or change their mind. Motivated and able employees are more likely to take a 
conscious decision, even if they retain their initial attitude. 
At this point, if a person is also more favourable/unfavourable to pension funds and the process 
has been rational and conscious, then we would expect that he/she will make a long-term change in 
his/her cognitive structure (box D in Figure 2). If the attitude change is relatively permanent and 
predictive of subsequent behaviour, then the employee made the choice following a central route 
(box E in Figure 2); otherwise, it is important to understand what happened. Petty and Cacioppo 
(1983) confirm in their theory that a central route can be followed only by individuals with 
motivation and ability, but these are necessary and not sufficient conditions. Therefore, even if 
employees are motivated and able to understand the message content, their attitude may be affected 
by positive or negative cues, contextual elements, or heuristics that allow them to evaluate the 
advocacy quickly, triggering once again a peripheral route (box F in Figure 2).  
We assess the presence of a long-term change in employees’ cognitive structures by checking 
whether the change in pension fund participation from 2006 to 2012 is consistent with the own 
response about the severance pay transfer. In particular, there is consistency between the change in 
the pension fund participation and the Tfr choice when the ‘Yes’ response is associated to a positive 
change in pension fund participation (i.e. the respondent did not have a pension fund in 2006, but 
has one in 2012) or the ‘No’ response is associated to a negative change in pension fund 
participation (i.e. the respondent had a pension fund in 2006, but no longer has one in 2012). In the 
former case consistency is obvious, since if employees decide not to deny the transfer of the 
                                                 
6 Before the 2007 reform all Italian firms were forced to set aside on their annual budget a percentage of the gross 
annual salary of their employees in order to finance their future severance pay. Since the severance pay is due only at 
the end of work relationship in a lump sum plus a low inflation-based return, in practice it represents a sort of cheap 
loan from employee to employer. After the reform became effective, regardless the employees’ decision to transfer their 
Tfr into a pension fund, medium-large firms lost this convenient financial source. Indeed, if employees in a larger firm 
now deny the Tfr transfer into a pension fund, then the future Tfr contributions will be managed by the Italian National 
Institute of Social Security. On the other hand, smaller firms can still take advantage of their employees’ severance pay 
if they decide not to transfer it into a pension fund. Therefore, employers of smaller firms had an incentive to convince 
their employees to deny the Tfr transferring. 
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severance pay, then they will surely have a pension fund in 2012.7 In the latter the decision may be 
driven by a higher consciousness of some negative characteristics of investing in a pension fund 
(e.g. higher riskiness). In sum, if there is no consistency, a peripheral route (box F in Figure 2) 
acted because the decision has not been really conscious; otherwise employees followed a central 
route (box E in Figure 2) and their attitude change is permanent. 
In conclusion, on the basis of ELM outcomes, there are two possible taxonomies of individuals. 
In fact, the sample of employees can be divided in three different groups: those who changed their 
initial attitude about pension funds in a conscious way (the ELM’s central route, CR); those who 
changed their pension fund participation in an unconscious way (the ELM’s peripheral route, PR); 
and those who decided to retain their initial attitude (RIA). Alternatively, the sample can be split in 
two between those who chose consciously and those who did not. In fact, also among those who 
retain their initial attitude there are people that decide to do that consciously: employees who end up 
in box H through step C (i.e. those who are motivated and able to process the message content).  
These two ways to categorize people represent our two variables of interest. The first variable is 
a multinomial variable, which can assume three (unordered) values (CR, PR, or RIA), while the 
second one is a binary variable (conscious or unconscious decision). 
We follow Petty and Rucker (2006) in a series of steps to assess the message effectiveness. In 
particular, they identify the following six steps, which we discuss in detail in the following 
subsections:  
1) Consider the audience elaboration level (are reform recipients prone to scrutinize the 
message carefully and able to do so?); 
2) Design and evaluate message characteristics; 
3) Evaluate message objectives (is the desired attitude change immediate or enduring?); 
4) Assess fit between audience elaboration, message characteristics and message objectives (is 
there consistency?); 
5) Test message effectiveness (is more effective under low or high elaboration?); 
6) Evaluate message effectiveness 
 
4.1. Audience elaboration level 
Evaluating the audience elaboration level is not a simple process, because it is based on many 
individual and contextual elements. Indeed, a person’s elaboration level, i.e. the skills to understand 
and scrutinize the message as well as the interest in the message content, can vary depending on 
individual characteristics, but also cultural characteristics. However, given that the message content 
is about pension funds and, more in general, pension investment choices, we estimate it through: 
time-to-retirement (i.e. the remaining number of years to reach retirement)8; financial literacy; risk 
aversion; and current participation in a pension fund. Since the reform became effective in 2007, in 
order to evaluate the audience elaboration level, and recalling that SHIW is a biannual survey, we 
consider only observations in the wave prior to the message, i.e. 2006. 
                                                 
7 Actually 4% of those who chose to transfer their Tfr into a pension fund then erroneously declared not to have a 
pension fund in 2012 (Table 3). Given the clear ambiguity of these answers, we decide to consider these few individuals 
as followers of a peripheral route and as takers of an unconscious decision.  
8 The time-to-retirement is calculated as the difference between 40 (necessary number of contribution years to retire) 




Table 3 – Work and economic descriptive variables of the sample for year and Tfr choice  
(mean values) 
 
Work and Economic Variables 
2006 2012 
Total Yes No Do not Know Total 
Job position           
  Worker 45.4% 42.3% 62.2% 55.9% 58.3% 
  Clerk 27.3% 37.5% 31.4% 40.2% 33.4% 
  Executive 7.0% 20.2% 6.5% 3.9% 8.3% 
  Other 20.3% - - - - 
Time-to-retirement group           
  Time-to-ret. > 30 24.2% 11.4% 22.0% 32.0% 21.5% 
  16-30 47.7% 32.9% 39.0% 40.0% 38.2% 
  Time-to-ret. ≤ 15 28.1% 55.7% 39.0% 28.0% 40.4% 
Company size           
  Employees ≤ 15 63.4% 13.1% 53.5% 46.5% 46.4% 
  16-49 13.1% 18.1% 24.4% 18.0% 
  50-99 10.2% 11.9% 7.0% 3.9% 7.4% 
  Employees ≥ 100 26.4% 61.9% 21.4% 25.2% 28.2% 
Expected replacement rate 64.1 63.3 61.9 65.7 62.5 
Unknown replacement rate - 29.2% 45.9% 62.2% 45.2% 
Disposable household income (€) 38,539 50,575 39,523 44,918 41,899 
Home ownership 70.2% 85.1% 70.8% 72.4% 73.3% 
Household wealth (€) 249,129 303,077 236,920 340,466 259,597 
Risk aversion           
  Low 1.2% 1.2% 0.5% 0.8% 0,7% 
  Medium 14.9% 9.5% 9.3% 7.1% 9,1% 
  High 83.9% 89.3% 90.2% 92.1% 90,3% 
Preference for short period 1 - 29.2% 35.4% 26.0% 33.3% 
Preference for lump sum 2 - 58.5% 64.2% 70.0% 63.6% 
Financial literacy 2 - 73.8% 59.6% 47.2% 60.4% 
Pension fund knowledge 2 - 64.9% 46.7% 42.5% 49.1% 
Pension fund participation in 2006 9.9% 26.8% 6.3% 9.4% 9.9% 
Pension fund participation in 2012 - 95.8% 11.5% 6.3% 24.1% 
Notes: 1 Evaluated in 2010; 2 Evaluated in 2008. All statistics refer to the total sample except for time-to-retirement, company size,  
expected replacement rate, and unknown replacement rate which are referred only to employees (i.e. workers, clerks and executives). 
 
Table 3 reports information on work and economic variables, according to the individual 
occupational status. Specifically, we have separated the sample in four categories: workers (i.e. 
blue-collar workers), clerks (i.e. white-collar workers), executives, and a residual category called 
‘Other’. While in the first three categories people are all employees, the residual category contains 
self-employed, unemployed, students, housewives, and other inactive statuses. ‘Other’ category 
represents about 20% of the total sample in 2006, but it is missing in 2012 (i.e. all individuals who 
were in the residual category in 2006, then are employed in 2012) since we defined our sample in 
order to have only employees in private sector in 2012. On the other hand, in 2006 workers 
13 
 
represent about 45% of the total sample, clerks 27.3%, and executives the remaining 7%. Among 
employees, 48% have a time-to-retirement between 15 and 30 years, while 28% have time-to-
retirement smaller or equal to 15. The group with time-to-retirement greater than 30, i.e. the group 
which should have the highest interest in the reform content, represents 24% of the sample. Most 
employees (63.4%) work in small companies (with less than 50 employees), about 26% worked in 
big companies (with at least 100 employees), while the mean expected replacement rate is equal to 
64.1.  
Considering all individuals in the sample, in 2006 the average household income is equal to 
€38,500, 70% are home-owner, and the average household wealth is equal to €249,000. Table 3 
shows also that Italians are very risk averse: only about 1% prefer investments with high levels of 
risks and returns, while 84% prefer low returns and low or no risk. Moreover only 10% of the 
sample participated in a pension fund in 2006.  
Regarding the financial literacy measurement, Fornero and Monticone (2011a) use three 
questions of the 2006 SHIW survey.9 In particular, these questions aim to discover how many 
individuals understand how inflation, interest rates, and stocks work (for the detailed questions, see 
Fornero and Monticone, 2011a). 
 





Understands how inflation works (%) 
No. of correct 
answers % of sample  No 30.3 
Yes 69.7 
Understands how interest rate works (%) 0 17.9 
No 55.7 1 18.6 
Yes 44.3 2 35.1 
Understands how stocks work  (%) 3 28.4 
No 40.2 Total 
(N = 575) 100.0 Yes 59.8 
 
Table 4 shows that individuals within the panel understood pretty well how inflation works, 
since almost 70% responded correctly. The majority of individuals (60%) understood also how 
stocks work, but only 44% correctly answered the question about interest rate. In conclusion, 28.4% 
of the sample had three correct answers out of three, while 18% gave the wrong answer to all three 
questions. If we define financial literacy as at least two questions out of three correct, then 63.5% of 
the sample is financially literate. 
 
4.2. Design message characteristics and objectives 
The content of a law is generally not easy to understand for the average individual. Moreover, 
laws are generally not formulated to involve or motivate people. This definitely also applies to the 
law on the pension reform (Legislative Decree no. 252/2005), which has the generic heading 
                                                 
9 In 2006 survey, financial literacy questions were not asked to the entire sample, but only to a half, extracted randomly, 
of it. For this reason total observations in the Table 4 are not 1,070, but 575. 
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«Regulation of non-compulsory pension schemes». Furthermore, the identity of the sender of the 
message transmitted via law is unclear. Although the political responsibility of a law belongs to the 
Government that writes it, for citizens it is difficult to understand who is specifically asking them to 
make the choice. The credibility of the law message is mainly determined by the Government (or 
the Prime Minister or the Minister of Labour and Welfare State), though other stakeholders (e.g. 
unions, banks, representatives of employers and politicians) could influence the law’s 
consequences, blurring or smoothing the initial idea of the reform. To deal with these issues and «to 
guarantee employees the possibility to choose and to determine their future consciously» (Damiano, 
2007), and also given the reform importance, the Italian Government decided in 2007 to 
communicate the message of the law through all available channels: a lot of public and private TV 
channels spoke about the reform in their talk shows; a specific hotline and a specific website were 
created for any questions by the citizens; a daily information event was realized on the main public 
TV channel (RAI 1). Obviously, there were also reform opponents but they represented a minority 
and were not associated to the message sender. 
The message, reported in Figure 2, is silent about several fundamental aspects of the employee’s 
choice. For example, it does not mention the fact that the higher return of pension funds is 
connected to higher risk, that tax incentives can change over time (regardless of their choice), or 
that the Tfr transfer is irrevocable. The choice of the message wording is supported by the 
documented fact that only a very small percentage of potential beneficiaries have full knowledge of 
the advantages and disadvantages of the reform, while most were completely unaware of them. 
Most information was given by potential beneficiaries of the reform by means of publications 
(books, articles), union meetings and TV shows. Moreover, in terms of paper documents, private 
employees only received the appropriate forms needed to make their decision on pension funds, not 
accompanied by any information to make the decision more conscious. Consequently the high 
number of missing or ‘Do not know’ responses may derive from the fact that message and forms to 
formalize the decision were not received at the same time. In other words, it is likely that many 
beneficiaries of the 2007 reform did not really receive the message, regardless of their motivation or 
ability. 
The reform was essentially meant to create pension fund investments for employees (plus linked 
tax benefits) linked to their severance pay so as to cope with a decreasing public pension in the 
future through a secondary pension income (pension fund return), probably higher than the 
traditional severance pay. In the end, given the message content and the irrevocable nature of the 
Tfr transferring decision when positive, the attitude change desired by the Italian Government was 
meant to be enduring.  
 
4.3. Assessing the fit between elaboration and message characteristics and objectives 
Tables 1 and 3 highlight differences in the demographic and socio-economic characteristics 
among the three different severance pay responses (‘Yes’, ‘No’ and ‘Do not know’), especially 
between ‘Yes’ respondents and the other two.10 The ‘Yes’ group is composed mainly by men, 
living in the North, married, with higher education and job skills, and higher average household 
                                                 
10 These differences are significant at the 1% level for size of the municipality of residence, household size, household 
wealth, expected replacement rate, risk aversion, and preference for short period and lump sum. Citizenship and gender 
are significant at the 5% level. 
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income compared to the other two groups. Most notably they are older than the others, which is 
contrary to expectations, since pension fund returns are supposed to be higher in the long run. On 
the other hand, the average age of employees who ‘Do not know’ is lower than in the total sample, 
showing a greater lack of interest of young people in their own pension situation. According to 
Pettigrew et al. (2007), a possible way to explain this outcome is that young people, regardless their 
education level, are characterized by a strong sense of ‘live for today’, low interest in financial 
planning, and a poor understanding of the available pension options. Given the strong correlation 
between time-to-retirement and age, the same result holds for time-to-retirement. 
The ‘Do not know’ group has the highest average household wealth, which may be interpreted as 
non-response or misreporting of the richer individuals, which is typical for investment choices 
(Cannari and D’Alessio, 1993; D’Alessio and Faiella, 2002). Another interesting difference among 
the three groups is in the size of the firm where respondents work. Indeed this is probably connected 
to the factors discussed above: different regulations in case of transfer denial according to firm size 
(penalizing smaller firms), and the presence of unions. Most people in the ‘Yes’ group work in 
companies with more than 100 employees, i.e. the ones with higher unionization rates, where ‘No’ 
and ‘Do not know’ individuals more often work in companies with less than 50 employees. It is 
plausible that in the latter two cases, employees were not adequately informed or forced by their 
employers to deny the severance pay transfer into pension funds, so that the firm retained a cheap 
financing source. This may happen regardless of the employees’ involvement in message content or 
ability to process it, compromising the individual decision process. 
Table 3 shows a plausible correlation with financial literacy and knowledge of pension funds. In 
the ‘Yes’ group about 73.8% of employees are financially literate and 64.9% of them are able to 
process the message content, while these percentages are much lower in the other two groups.11 
Those who decided to transfer their Tfr into a pension fund also have a higher pension funds 
participation (26.8%) and more knowledge (or at least consciousness) of their future pension 
income: they have the lowest percentage that in 2012 did not report their expected replacement rate 
(29.2%), while the ‘Do not know’ group of employees has the highest value of this rate (62.2%). 
Contrary to expectations given pension funds characteristics (e.g. riskiness, period of investment, 
and return modalities of invested capital) and reform objectives (i.e. increase the future replacement 
rate), there is no significant difference between ‘Yes’ group and the others in the expected 
replacement rate, risk aversion, and preference for short period and lump sum.
 
                                                 
11 Financial literacy rate in Table 3 was calculated taking into account the three questions of the 2008 SHIW survey.  
The 2008 set of questions is not exactly the same as the 2006 one discussed in Section 4.1, because questions about 
interest rate and stocks market are replaced with questions about risk diversification and riskiness of financial 
instruments (for details, see Fornero and Monticone, 2011b). The criterion used to define someone as financially literate 
is equal to the one discussed in Section 4.1: at least two correct answers out of three. 
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Table 5 – Tfr choice and change in pension funds participation by motivation and ability 







Choice about the 
Tfr Transfer 
Change in Pension Funds Participation (2006 – 2012) Total 
No – No No – Yes Yes – No Yes - Yes 
People who are neither motivated nor able to process 
 Yes 
0 50 1 8 59 
0.0% 42.4% 50.0% 18.6% 35.1% 
No 372 26 13 2 413 56.8% 36.6% 41.9% 11.1% 53.3% 
 Do not know 109 6 10 2 127 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Total 481 82 24 12 599 62.5% 42.1% 55.8% 19.0% 56.0% 
People who are both motivated and able to process 
Yes 5 68 1 35 109 100.0% 57.6% 50.0% 81.4% 64.9% 
No 283 45 18 16 362 43.2% 63.4% 58.1% 88.9% 46.7% 
Do not know 0 0 0 0 0 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Total 
288 113 19 51 471 







Legend: No means no participation, Yes means participation, hence No-No and Yes-Yes 
correspond to no change.  
 
Table 5 reports the Tfr choice and change in pension funds participation from 2006 to 2012 by 
motivation and ability. It highlights that 64.9% of those who answered ‘Yes’ can be considered both 
motivated and able to process, compared to 46.7% of those who denied the transfer. Table 5 also 
shows that among those who changed their participation in pension funds from ‘No’ in 2006 to 
‘Yes’ in 2012, a substantial part (42.1%) were not really involved in the message content or able to 
correctly scrutinize it, leading to a potentially unconscious decision. Among motivated and able 
employees who changed from ‘No’ to ‘Yes’, 45 out of 113 respondents decided not to give up their 
severance pay. Despite this, they can be considered as ‘success cases’ of the 2007 reform in terms 
of the attitude change aimed for by the Italian Government (i.e. investing in a pension fund to better 
cope with a lower public pension in the future). In fact, they decided to participate in a pension 
fund. Nonetheless according to the ELM they however followed a peripheral route, because their 
response (‘No’) seemed to determine only a temporary stance. 
 
4.4.  Testing and evaluating message effectiveness  
As discussed above, the implementation of an ELM model provides three possible outcomes: I) 
individuals follow a central route to take their decision; II) individuals follow a peripheral route, not 
really taking a conscious decision; III) individuals retain their initial attitude. Table 6 highlights that 
the most common ELM outcome is the third one, showing a very high reluctance of Italian 
households in changing their attitude about the participation in pension funds (77.8%). Among 
people who changed their attitudes about pension funds the most common route was the peripheral 
one (14.2% of the sample), pointing out that Italian employees were overall influenced. This may 
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have happened because the message was not clearly explained or correctly provided, and also 
because Italian employees did not have, on average, the necessary motivation and ability to make a 
well-reasoned decision about such a complex subject. This creates the best condition to allow 
contextual stakeholders (e.g. employers and unions) to significantly influence private employees. 
As a consequence, only a small part of population (8.0%) is found to have taken a conscious 
decision. 
 






ELM Outcome Choice about the Tfr Transfer Total Yes No Do not know 
Central Route 68 18 0 86 40.5% 2.3% 0.0% 8.0% 
Peripheral Route 52 84 16 152 31.0% 10.8% 12.6% 14.2% 
Retain Initial Attitude 48 673 111 832 28.6% 86.8% 87.4% 77.8% 
Total 
168 775 127 1,070 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
      







ELM Outcome Change in Pension Funds Participation (2006 - 2012) Total 
No - No No - Yes Yes - No Yes - Yes 
Central Route 0 68 18 0 86 0.0% 34.9% 41.9% 0.0% 8.0% 
Peripheral Route 0 127 25 0 152 0.0% 65.1% 58.1% 0.0% 14.2% 
Retain Initial Attitude 769 0 0 63 832 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 77.8% 
Total 
769 195 43 63 1,070 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
       Legend: No: no participation; Yes: participation. Hence No-No and Yes-Yes correspond to no 
change.  
 
Regarding the ELM outcomes by Tfr choice group, retaining initial attitude was the most 
common outcome in ‘No’ and ‘Do not know’ groups, while employees who answered ‘Yes’ 
retained their initial attitude only in 28.6% of cases (Table 6). However this latter group is the one 
that shows the highest percentages in central and peripheral routes. In particular, among 
respondents answering ‘Yes’ to the Tfr transfer question, according to the ELM results, 40.5% 
followed a central route, while the remaining part followed a peripheral route reaching a not fully 
conscious decision. Instead, observing the relationship between ELM outcomes and changes in 
pension funds participation from 2006 to 2012, the peripheral route represents the favourite route 
among Italian employees that decided to change their attitude about pension funds both positively 
and negatively (Table 7). In fact only 34.9% of those who positively changed their initial attitude 
















0 152 498 650 
0.0% 100.0% 59.9% 60.7% 
Yes 
86 0 334 420 
100.0% 0.0% 40.1% 39.3% 
Total 
86 152 832 1,070 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
  
 
Table 8 shows that a substantial part (40.1%) of those who retained their attitude about pension 
funds did it consciously. Overall, irrespective of the route and the final attitude, 39.3% of the 
sample took the decision consciously. 
 
Table 9 – Tfr choice and change in pension funds participation by consciousness  







Choice about      
the Tfr Transfer 
Change in Pension Funds Participation (2006 - 2012) Total No - No No - Yes Yes - No Yes - Yes 
Unconscious decision 
Yes 5 50 2 8 65 100.0% 42.4% 100.0% 18.6% 38.7% 
No 372 71 13 2 458 56.8% 100.0% 41.9% 11.1% 59.1% 
Do not know 109 6 10 2 127 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Total 486 127 25 12 650 63.2% 65.1% 58.1% 19.0% 60.7% 
Conscious decision 
Yes 0 68 0 35 103 0.0% 57.6% 0.0% 81.4% 61.3% 
No 283 0 18 16 317 43.2% 0.0% 58.1% 88.9% 40.9% 
Do not know 0 0 0 0 0 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Total 
283 68 18 51 420 







Legend: No means no participation, Yes means participation, hence No-No and Yes-Yes 
correspond to no change.  
 
Table 9 highlights that the percentage of those who answer ‘Yes’ to the Tfr transfer question take 
a conscious decision (61.3%) is higher than that one of employees who respond ‘No’ (40.9%). 
Moreover, Table 9 shows that there is a lack of consciousness regardless of the employees’ change 
in pension funds participation from 2006 to 2012. Indeed, the only category with more employees 
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taking than not taking a conscious decision (i.e. ‘Yes-Yes’ column) is the smallest one - in the other 
three categories they always represent a minority. 
5. An econometric analysis of the ELM outcomes  
In order to evaluate the impact of demographic and socio-economic characteristics on the 
probability that an employee follows a specific ELM route and to take a conscious decision, a 
multivariate analysis is now conducted estimating two different binary response models: a 
Multinomial Logit Model (MLM) for the ELM outcomes and a Logit Model for the consciousness 
of decision, both by the standard maximum likelihood procedure.  
The model specification for the ELM outcomes is the following: 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗 = 𝛽𝑗𝑋𝑗𝐼 + 𝛾𝑗𝑋𝑗𝐻 +  𝜔𝑗𝑋𝑗𝑊 + 𝜗𝑗𝑋𝑗𝐼𝑊 + 𝛿𝑗𝑋𝑗𝐹 + 𝜀𝑗𝑗 
 where ELM is an multinomial variable which can assume three values that cannot be ordered 
and represent the possible ELM outcomes (CR, PR, or RIA), j denotes the ELM outcome ( j = 1, 2, 
3), i denotes the employee (i = 1, …, N), X I is a vector of individual characteristics (gender, age, 
marital status, education level), X H is a vector of household characteristics of the employee (area of 
residence, size of the municipality of residence, number of household components), X W is a vector 
of work characteristics (job position, company size), X IW is a vector of household income and 
wealth information (income quintile, home ownership, wealth quintile), and X F is a vector of 
individual economic and financial information (knowledge of own pension situation and pension 
funds, risk aversion, financial literacy, preference for short period investments). For a detailed 
description of each variable see Table A1 in the Appendix. The base outcome in the Multinomial 
Logit estimation is the third one: retaining initial attitude (RIA). It follows that Multinomial Logit 
marginal effects in Table 10 must be interpreted as an increase/decrease in the probability to follow 
a central route (first outcome) or a peripheral route (second outcome) respect to retain initial 
attitude. 
On the other hand, we estimate the probability of taking a conscious decision in 2012 using the 
following logit model: 
𝐶𝑗 = 𝛽𝑋𝑗𝐼 + 𝛾𝑋𝑗𝐻 +  𝜔𝑋𝑗𝑊 + 𝜗𝑋𝑗𝐼𝑊 + 𝛿𝑋𝑗𝐹 + 𝑢𝑗 
where C is a binary variable which is equal to 1 if decision is conscious and 0 otherwise, and 
regressors are the same included in the multinomial logit model. 
Table 10 reports the marginal effects of the controls on the ELM outcomes (Multinomial Logit) 
in column (1)-(3) and on the consciousness of the decision (Logit) in column (4). Results show that 
gender does not matter either in changing initial attitude or in consciousness of the decision process, 
somewhat in contrast to some studies in household finance highlighting a higher probability of 
women to be financially excluded (Lusardi, Mitchell and Curto, 2009; van Rooij, Lusardi and 
Alessie, 2011; Fornero and Monticone, 2011a). Also being young (i.e. less than 35) does not lead to 
a higher probability to change initial attitude about pension funds, although the 2007 reform was 
primarily directed to younger generations. Only being 35-45 years old in 2012 determines a 
(marginally) statistically significant higher probability to change initial attitude with respect to older 





Table 10 – Determinants of the ELM outcomes (Multinomial Logit)  
and of the decision consciousness (Logit): marginal effects  
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Central route CR 
Peripheral route 
PR 




          
Female -0.003 0.000 0.002 0.002 
Age < 35 0.004 -0.012 0.008 -0.040 
Age 35-45 -0.016 0.066* -0.050 -0.075** 
Age 45-55 0.003 0.026 -0.029 -0.040 
Married 0.044 0.015 -0.059 0.052 
High school 0.050** 0.032 -0.082** 0.012 
University 0.078*** 0.009 -0.087* 0.027 
Center -0.007 -0.002 0.009 0.006 
South -0.028 0.040 -0.012 -0.096*** 
Small city -0.002 0.065** -0.062* -0.011 
Big city -0.021 0.028 -0.006 0.009 
Household size = 2 -0.055 -0.031 0.086 -0.061 
Household size = 3 -0.066 -0.081 0.147* -0.023 
Household size = 4 -0.035 -0.101 0.136* 0.024 
Household size ≥ 5 -0.039 -0.039 0.078 0.054 
Worker 0.008 0.014 -0.022 0.022 
Executive -0.019 0.028 -0.009 0.026 
Employees ≤ 15 -0.071** -0.050 0.121*** -0.009 
15 < Empl. < 50 -0.067** 0.031 0.037 -0.115*** 
Employees ≥ 100 -0.015 0.054 -0.039 -0.055* 
Medium income -0.015 0.086** -0.071 0.021 
High income 0.051* 0.060 -0.111** -0.011 
Home ownership 0.037 -0.022 -0.015 0.034 
Second wealth quintile -0.053 0.058 -0.004 0.049 
Third wealth quintile -0.085 0.039 0.046 0.042 
Fourth wealth quintile -0.084 0.090* -0.006 0.021 
Fifth wealth quintile -0.097 0.063 0.034 -0.001 
Unknown repl. rate -0.005 -0.022 0.027 -0.026 
High risk aversion 0.020 -0.113** 0.093* 0.056* 
Preference for short period 0.003 -0.027 0.024 0.031 
Financial literacy 0.018 -0.017 -0.002 0.013 
Pension funds knowledge 0.051*** -0.025*** -0.026** 0.204*** 
          
Observations 1,070 1,070 1,070 1,070 
Pseudo R-squared 0.149 0.149 0.149 0.559 
Log Likelihood -615.2 -615.2 -615.2 -316.3 




Moreover, results show a strong impact of higher education levels on the probability to change 
consciously initial attitude. Nonetheless, having a high education level does not have a role in the 
decision consciousness (column 4). Geographic dummies (column 1) are not significant when 
looking at determinants of CR (w.r.t. RIA), but living in the South has a strongly significant 
negative effect on the decision consciousness. Living a small city is associated to a higher 
probability to change via a PR the initial attitude about pension funds. The size of the company has 
a significant effect on ELM outcomes and the consciousness of decision process: with respect to 
medium-large firms (i.e. with more than 50 employees), working in a small one determines a much 
lower probability to change via a CR the initial attitude and, more in general, to take a conscious 
decision. On the other hand, employees in large companies seem to have been influenced more by 
some contextual element (e.g. unions) and, as a consequence, show a significant lower probability 
to consciously decide about the Tfr transfer. In other words, employees in large companies may 
have received more and better information about pension funds and reform objectives thanks to 
information meetings organized by unions, but this may have strongly influenced those employees 
who were neither motivated nor able to process contents of reform message. 
Table 10 shows that job position dummies, quintiles of household wealth and income, and home 
ownership do not affect the consciousness of the decision process. Nonetheless, people with  high 
income (i.e. belonging to the fourth or fifth income quintiles of the total population) have a slightly 
higher probability to follow a CR, while employees with a medium income (i.e. belonging to the 
third income quintile of the total population) are more likely to follow a PR. As expected having a 
high risk aversion determines a big deterrent to be influenced to change own initial attitude or to 
unconsciously take an important choice such as the Tfr transfer one. On the other hand, knowing or 
being able to figure out the future replacement rate and the preference for short period investments 
do not to have a statistically significant impact on the probability to change the pension funds 
participation and to choose consciously about the Tfr transferring. As expected, pension funds 
knowledge has a clear-cut and positive role in determining decision making via a CR and, more in 
general, in taking the Tfr choice consciously. Finally, financial literacy is positively associated with 
the probability to follow a CR and with consciousness, but it is never statistically significant, 
contrary to studies on this topic (Fornero and Monticone, 2011b). It follows that in this specific 
decision, once environmental elements and characteristics of elaboration processes (e.g. motivation 
and ability to process) are accounted for, financial literacy is not anymore important in explaining 
the consciousness of the Tfr choice. 
 
5.1. Robustness checks 
Robustness tests of the results of Table 10 are conducted along several dimensions, which are 
just summarized here (details are available upon request). 
As for the controls, we tried different specifications of some of them: quadratic specification for 
age (instead of age classes), quadratic specification for income and wealth (instead of quintiles), 
linear specification for household size (instead of dummies). All results in Table 10 hold. 
In order to verify the non-significance of financial literacy, first of all, we use a level-
specification (i.e. the number of correct answers) or specific dummies for the three questions. 
Secondly, we remove from the model specification the education level and the company size 
dummies. In both these checks, financial literacy turn out non-significant.  
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Finally, we remove from the model specification the control “pension funds knowledge”. In this 
case, both in Multinomial Logit and Logit estimations financial literacy variable become significant. 
However, while the marginal effect of financial literacy is strongly statistically significant (1%) on 
the choice consciousness, it is only marginally significant (10%) on the probability to follow a CR 
respect to RIA. Therefore we believe the main specification is better and our final considerations 
about financial literacy are robust. 
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper aims to explain the heterogeneity in pension choices through the Elaboration 
Likelihood Model (ELM) proposed by (Petty and Cacioppo, 1983), which reproduces the 
elaboration process that occurs when there is an attempt to change a person’s attitude through 
communication. When motivation and ability to think are high, individuals are inclined to follow a 
“central route to persuasion”, otherwise they follow a “peripheral route to persuasion”. Although 
the ELM has been mainly used so far in marketing studies for assessing the effectiveness of 
advertisement on consumers’ choices, as far as we know this paper represents the first attempt to 
use it to investigate pension choice. 
In particular, we use ELM in order to analyse the heterogeneity in pension choices connected to 
the 2007 Italian reform that allowed transferring future severance pay’s contributions into a pension 
fund. In fact, the reform was accompanied by an information campaign with a quite clear message 
that resembled an advertisement in favour of the pension fund choice. To this end we use data from 
the Bank of Italy’s Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW), which includes a question on 
the choice about the severance pay’s transfer into a pension fund. Specifically, we exploit the 
information of four waves: one before (2006) and three after the reform (2008, 2010 and 2012). 
In order to develop an empirical assessment of the effectiveness of the reform message, we set 
our research question into the traditional ELM scheme, whereby the starting point is the definition 
of the message proposed by the Government with this reform. Relying on many different sources 
(literature, publications and media) we synthetize it as follows: “Pension funds plus tax incentives 
linked to them can guarantee a higher retirement income, compared to the severance pay (Tfr)”. 
Then we use the SHIW data to assess whether the employee has the involvement/motivation, and 
the necessary ability to process the message in order to associate each individual one of the three 
possible ELM outcomes: I) decision reached via a central route; II) decision reached via a 
peripheral route; III) retaining the initial attitude. Since among those who retain their initial attitude 
some did it consciously, an alternative association is between individuals and consciousness and 
unconsciousness of the decision.  
Then to evaluate the impact of demographic and socio-economic characteristics of employees on 
the probability to follow a specific ELM route and to take a conscious decision, we performed a 
multivariate analysis estimating two different binary response models: a Multinomial Logit Model 
for the three ELM outcomes and a Logit Model for the consciousness of decision. Main results are 
from regression analysis are that being female or a living in the South do not represent ceteris 
paribus a threat to consciousness, low income or wealth have are associated to a lower probability 
to change their initial attitude; generic financial literacy is not statistically significant in taking a 
conscious decision, high education level (developed cognitive skills) and a specific knowledge of 
pension funds seem to have a strong impact on choice consciousness; individuals working in large 
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companies have more and better information on the reform content (possibly due to the presence of 
unions), but also a higher probability of being influenced, having a high risk aversion reduces the 
probability of being influenced. 
In conclusion, the decision to transfer the Tfr into a pension fund was taken by more educated 
and older individuals, with a high household income, even though these individuals are also 
generally richer. This evidence is not surprising in Italy, where pension funds are a relatively new 
and the public pension system was traditionally generous. However, those who would have the 
greatest need because low income or younger did not receive or understand the message of the 
reform, deciding not to give up the severance pay in favour of a potential higher future retirement 
income. Thus, the message of the information campaign of 2007 reform was overall not very 
effective. Moreover, our ELM application highlights that generic financial literacy does not 
significantly affect decision consciousness, figuring out a more relevant role in the employees’ 
elaboration process for other elements such as: the individual’s comprehension of the specific 
choice object (pension funds), cognitive skills, and influencing elements (e.g. unions, employer’s 
pressure). These considerations may have useful policy implications for the effectiveness of 
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Table A.1 – SHIW variables description
 
Variables Description 
Dependent variables  
ELM outcomes  Multinomial variable which can assume three values that cannot be ordered and represent the possible ELM outcomes (CR, PR, or RIA)  
Decision consciousness Binary variable which is equal to 1 if decision is conscious and 0 otherwise 
Control variables  
Female Binary variable taking value 1 for female, 0 for male. 
Age < 35 
Age 35-45 
Age 45-55 
Binary variables representing the age group of employees. The reference 
category is Age ≥ 55. 
Married Binary variable taking value 1 for married employees, and 0 otherwise.  
High school 
University 
Binary variables representing the highest education level achieved. The 








Binary variables representing the size of the municipality of residence. The 
reference category is Medium city. 
Household size = 2 
Household size = 3 
Household size = 4 
Household size ≥ 5 
Binary variables representing the household size. The reference category is 
Household size = 1. 
Worker 
Executive 
Binary variables representing the job position. The reference category is 
Clerk (i.e. white-collar worker). 
Employees < 35 
Employees 15-50 
Employees ≥ 100 




Binary variables representing the income quintile. Medium income is the 
third quintile, while High income represents fourth and fifth ones. The 
reference category is Low income (first and second quintile). 
Second wealth quintile 
Third wealth quintile 
Fourth wealth quintile 
Fifth wealth quintile 
Binary variables representing the wealth quintile. The reference category is 
First wealth quintile. 
Unknown replacement rate Binary variable taking value 1 for employees who did not declare their expectation about the future replacement rate, 0 otherwise. 
High risk aversion 
Binary variable taking value 1 for employees who declared to prefer an 
investment with high or very high returns, but also with high or very high 
probability to lose a portion of their invested capitals. 
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Preference for short period 
Binary variable taking value 1 for employees who declared that if they won a 
lottery where the prize is equal to the annual household disposable income 
and it is postponed by a year, then they would give up to at least 10% of this 
prize to receive it immediately; 0 otherwise. 
Financial literacy Binary variable taking value 1 for employees who correctly answered to at least two out of the three questions discussed in Section 4.4, 0 otherwise.  
Pension funds knowledge Binary variable taking value 1 for employees who correctly answered to at least two out of the four questions discussed in Section 4, 0 otherwise. 
 
 
 
